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1. METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF EVERYTHING GARDENS AND OTHER STORIES 
 
Introduction 
 
Everything Gardens and Other Stories (Russi 2015, hereinafter Everything 
Gardens) is my contribution to a growing body of scholarship challenging 
academic practices of talking about (rather than from within) the social. In this 
chapter, I endeavour to ground the study I undertake in the book, by discussing 
the sources of a methodological approach for overcoming a pre-emptive 
limitation of the field of inquiry by means of a definition, in favour of an 
investigation of practice ‘from within’. To articulate a methodological position 
involves justifying the process by which an account has been produced (Howell 
2013, 9). Here, my entry point into an endeavour of this sort is through 
distancing the study undertaken in Everything Gardens from the expectation—
typical of a positivistic approach—to rush for a definition. The commonplace act 
of definition is a way of restricting the social imagery to only that, which the 
academic might be comfortable with, speaking from within a particular scholarly 
tradition of argumentation. It undertakes an a priori selection of the possibilities 
for life together that the social phenomenon of Transition, which I present in the 
monograph, is capable of disclosing. 
In contrast to this, Everything Gardens experiments with a different 
approach. In the book, I work my way into Transition starting from where it 
began (e.g. the embodied disquiet arising from information about peak-oil), 
without taking this as the point of reference for an over-anxious act of definition. 
My intention is, instead, to follow that initial disquiet in its unfolding. What 
guides my exploration of Transition is not so much a concern for accurate 
representation of a ‘social movement’ existing ‘out there’ in seemingly 
unproblematic and self-contained form. Instead, it is the moral-practical 
interrogation of an evolving milieu, trying to understand how it ‘hangs together’ 
and what sorts of interventions are called forth from within the concerns that 
become apparent inside it. 
Against this background of considerations, the present chapter offers a 
discussion of the relevant methodology—justifying how I have come to produce 
the account offered in the book—by appealing to a number of resources that I 
have relied upon. More specifically, it lays out the methodological scaffolding for 
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the paradigm of inquiry that infuses Everything Gardens, which strives to afford 
an attention to process, i.e. to the continuous and contested coming-into-being 
of socio-material formations, as opposed to taking for granted reified definitions 
spelling out what the Transition movement is meant to achieve. 
This type of approach is one largely informed by the phenomenological 
tradition in philosophy and sociology, the outlines of which I sketch in section i. 
Subsequently, the works of Harold Garfinkel and Bruno Latour reveal deep 
resonances and fruitful insights for applying phenomenological thinking to the 
study of the social. It is to their contributions that I turn in section ii. Section iii 
goes on to flesh out the sense of a much more fluid social ontology constellated 
by shifting configurations of human-object entanglements. The protagonists of 
this discussion become Latour (again) and Hodder; Hodder’s work, in particular, 
marks the possibility of imagining ethical deliberation as taking place in a 
predicament of fundamental entanglement, which is coterminous with the 
unfolding of social life. Section iv takes these considerations in the direction of 
challenging rigid distinctions between what is ‘human’ and what is an ‘object’ 
(which reflects in the looseness of my definition of culture throughout the book) 
and the conflation of questions of epistemology and ontology in fluid, hybrid 
social milieus. This is where I look at Karen Barad’s thinking and familiarise 
myself with the notion of intra-action. This is also where I set Barad in 
conversation with Pickering’s work on socio-materiality and with Goethe and his 
contribution to the phenomenology of nature (as articulated in the elegant prose 
of Henri Bortoft). Where this conversation culminates, for me, is in the little-
known work (at least in sociology) of John Shotter. Shotter’s work manages to 
articulate the beginnings of a movement of the social in shared, pre-linguistic 
sensings experienced in our bodies. In his work I find the necessary resources 
to follow the contested and contingent development of unfinished, living cultural 
traditions (an aspiration shared with Ingold’s programme of phenomenological 
anthropology). Building on those resources, I suggest that the coming-into-
being of socio-material formations engages us equally on the ontological (as co-
creators) and on the moral level (as beings entangled in the relationships we 
choose to continue, and exposed to their demands). Finally, section vi offers a 
further summary of the extent to which the methodological considerations 
presented here are reflected in Everything Gardens, and in the practical 
methods that informed the research leading up to it. 
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i. Phenomenological moorings 
The conversation I am about to sketch in the following sections—about the self-
specification of the social, its temporality, as well as about the entangled and 
co-creative (or symmetrical) quality of agential trajectories deployed within it—
has a history. In fact, the earliest formulation of this direction of inquiry is 
perhaps the one afforded by Edmund Husserl at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Husserl’s original concern was the (modernist) aspiration to ground 
philosophy as a rigorous science. For this purpose, he brought to bear on that 
inquiry his experience as a mathematician. He observed how logical and 
mathematical propositions, as experienced, appear meaningful ‘even in the 
absence of a theory about what kind of existence they may have’ (Detmer 2013, 
63). Extending this insight to objects of experience more generally, Husserl 
argued that their meanings could disclose themselves to us, without us having 
to worry about ascertaining their ontological status (e.g. deciding whether or not 
they exist as ‘things in themselves’, as Kant had postulated). He therefore 
explored the practice of ‘bracketing’ (‘phenomenological reduction’ or epoché), 
which consisted in focusing solely on the way things appear to us, apart from 
any assumptions one may hold about their independent existence (Harman 
2007, 42). Building on that initial suspension of one’s ‘natural’ presuppositions 
about the structure of experience, Husserl advocated for a further bracketing 
(‘eidetic reduction’) of the perspectival contingency through which an 
appearance is encountered, in order to grasp the necessary features of a 
phenomenon, its eidos or essence. This was not, for Husserl, to be understood 
as an inductive process (abstracting from multiple instances) but it was more a 
case of dwelling in the appearance of a phenomenon of interest, and imagining 
as many variations of it as possible (Detmer 2013, 153). This ‘imaginative free 
variation’, to lead to an intuition of the essence of a phenomenon, is remarkably 
close to Goethe’s approach to the study of plants. Goethe (who lived a couple 
of generations before Husserl) spoke of the need to dwell in ‘exact sensory 
imagination’, in order for the unity and continuity of the plant to shine through its 
particular features, so that the latter would stand out as the living manifestations 
of an unfolding, organic whole:  
 
Organs which can be quite different in outer appearance are 
recognized as being manifestations of the same form, so that the 
plant now appears as the repeated expression of the same organ—
  5
which nowhere appears externally as such. Seeing the plant 
intuitively in this way is to experience its ‘coming into being’, instead 
of analyzing the plant in its finished state (Bortoft 1998, 46–47).  
 
By beholding relatedness-in-difference in the bodying forth of a living whole, 
Goethe grasped the possibility of letting the plant ‘[become] its own language’ 
(Bortoft 1998, 47), an objective remarkably close to Husserl’s concern for 
intuiting the essence or eidos of a phenomenon. At the heart of Husserl’s (and 
Goethe’s) speculation is, therefore, the sense that consciousness affords the 
conditions for the disclosure of meaning through lived experience (Moran 2000, 
144). This orientation in Husserl’s thinking articulates phenomenology as a 
fundamental inquiry into the conditions of meaning formation (Moran 2000, 
108). To this end, Husserl introduced the correlatives of noesis and noema. 
These could be roughly understood, respectively, as (i) the mode through which 
an experience is encountered and (ii) what is experienced as a result. The 
noesis-noema correlation supplants the subject-object correlation of Cartesian 
dualism, in that it entails a ‘refocusing from what is conceived to the act of 
conceiving, while engaged in the act of conceiving that which is conceived’ 
(Bortoft 1996, 281). The noesis-noema correlate, therefore, suggests an 
intensive—rather than extensive—articulation of consciousness, by defining ‘the 
condition of possibility of experiencing both the subject and the object’ (Stewart 
and Mickunas 1974, 37).  
In this sense, Husserl’s remarks on the noesis and the noema echo in the 
scholarship of, among others, Bruno Latour (discussed in section iii) and Karen 
Barad (discussed in section iv). In his attempt to institute greater symmetry 
between the agency of humans and of nonhumans, Latour moves away from 
reified notions of subject and object and brings into focus instead the processes 
of subjectification and objectification whereby subjects and objects come into 
being (van Loon 2012, 199–200; see also Harman 2009, 107). Similarly, 
Barad’s concern with apparatuses through which agential cuts—the distinctions 
that determine entities separate from one another—are effected appears in line 
with Husserl’s correlation between a certain poise or mode of prehension 
(noesis) and the progressive specification of a phenomenon (noema) through 
the agential cuts that are so enacted. Consciousness, in this sense, is 
disclosive of the world. Which is why the study of consciousness, by unveiling 
the ‘intimate intentional relationship between consciousness and the world’ 
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(Stewart and Mickunas 1974, 47), ultimately led Husserl towards the end of his 
career towards a more pronounced focus on the ‘lifeworld’: ‘the life-world is a 
world as phenomenon, as correlative of our intentional experiences’ (Moran 
2000, 181).  
And the lifeworld was also the focus of two later students of Husserl: Alfred 
Schutz and Martin Heidegger. Schutz built on Husserl’s insight about the 
‘generative immanence’ that is coessential to being present in the world, so as 
to overcome all-too-easy simplifications about how action unfolds. Specifically, 
enactments are not decided upon observation of a separate environment, its 
interpretation by reference to some external criterion of judgment and 
subsequent implementation of a plan. On the contrary, trajectories of action are 
actively negotiated at the interface where resources generated inside the 
tradition of a particular group culture meet ‘the strivings that our consciousness 
is spontaneously aiming towards in the situation it thus finds itself’ (Lock and 
Strong 2010, 41). In this sense, Schutz’s focus on the tension between the 
anticipations built into a particular tradition and the possibilities of disruption 
of—and innovation upon—any ingrained expectations (Inglis and Thorpe 2012, 
90) anticipates somewhat both Garfinkel’s notion of ‘indexical meanings’ (and 
his focus on their social production), described in the next section, as well as 
Shotter’s use of the notion of a ‘living tradition’ as perched between drift and the 
possibility of new ‘organizational moments’ (Shotter 2011b), which I discuss in 
section v. 
Martin Heidegger, another student of Husserl, shared a similar attention for 
the lifeworld, and articulates in greater detail the phenomenological stance. So, 
for instance, he made it explicit that phenomenology is bound up with a concern 
for ontology (i.e. for how the world is disclosed in and through consciousness) 
rather than for epistemology (i.e. for becoming conscious of a supposedly ‘out 
there’ world): it is in this sense that he described his work as ‘fundamental 
ontology’, to embrace the participatory process by which the world emerges in 
human existence (Moran 2000, 197). In particular, being-in-the-world is always 
entangled with resources that are ready-to-hand, and on which it relies 
(Verbeek 2005, 78), as opposed to staring at those as though they presented 
themselves before a detached observer (Lock and Strong 2010, 59–60). In this 
sense, it is to Heidegger’s that one can liken positions—such as those of 
Pickering (Pickering 2008, 4, section iv below), Mol (Mol 2002, 50, section iii 
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below) Ingold (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001, 152, section v below) and Latour 
(Verbeek 2005, 102–103, section iii below)—that posit a condition of 
fundamental entwining of humans and nonhumans (Hodder 2012, 28–9). 1 
Heidegger saw his position as a departure from what he—perhaps unfairly—
perceived as the limitations of Husserl’s ‘bracketing’ procedure, which he 
thought involved a certain detachment, so that being was examined as if from 
the outside, rather than from within. He therefore saw his project as one way of 
sticking more closely to the ‘generative immanence’ that inheres to being 
present in the world. A central condition of this immanence is temporality, that is 
the unfolding of being in time, and the ensuing tension between sticking to the 
resources handed down in tradition and the projection of new possibilities 
(Moran 2000, 243).2  
This tension is one that would be further elaborated by Heidegger’s student 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, who talks of ‘events in a tradition’ in a manner that is 
strikingly close to Shotter’s ‘organisational moments’ (section v below), as 
instances where emergent difference makes itself present, in relation to the 
extant development of a particular shared form of life (Lock and Strong 2010, 
69).  
On this reading, it follows that being is always to an extent indeterminate, in 
the sense that—by virtue of its unfolding through time—it is marked by the 
continual production of opportunities to enact new distinctions, from within a 
particular lifeworld. Therefore, being-in-the-world appears to have an essentially 
ethical dimension, in that the question of how to relate to otherness is a defining 
feature of being as entangled presence. This is a point that has subsequently 
been made explicit by Levinas (Moran 2000, 349–50), and upon which Barad 
draws in order to outline the ethical call that is inherent in the very ‘worlding of 
                                            
1 Albeit with the important distinction that Heidegger’s characterisation of 
being-in-the-world is very much restricted to human participation, and is hence 
thoroughly asymmetrical in its starting point (Harman 2009, 67). 
2 If we understand being-in-the-world as bundled to an orientation towards 
future possibilities (Bolman 2013)—immanent to its temporal unfolding—it is not 
improbable to find resonance between the work of Heidegger and Deleuze’s 
refocusing of phenomenology towards becoming, in the sense of the constant 
production of difference (Ma 2005, 112).   
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the world’ (Barad 2007, 391 ff., section iv below). Merleau-Ponty also 
contributed to this perspective, by adding that the responsiveness elicited by 
such indeterminacy is experienced and related to in the body (Moran 2000, 414 
& 419; see also Inglis and Hughson 2000, 124–25), a claim that echoes, for 
instance, Shotter’s inquiry3 into the bodily disquiets at the root of all shared 
forms of life: where the cultural formation of imaginative universals first 
proceeds from probing for and gesturing towards shared sensory topics (section 
v below). 
 
ii. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodologies 
The methodological stance towards practices of social inquiry that emerges 
from the phenomenological conversation—particularly its attention towards the 
process of self-disclosure of a shared form of life—finds a useful continuation in 
the writings of Harold Garfinkel. In his seminal contribution, Studies in 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967), he introduces the idea that, if sociology is 
to understand ‘the organized activities of everyday life’ (Garfinkel 1967, vii), 
then it is important for it to be able to account for the ways in which the social is 
assembled precisely as ‘an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities 
of everyday life’ (Garfinkel 1967, vii). To develop a toolbox that makes this 
possible, Garfinkel coins the term ‘ethnomethodology’. Ethnomethodologies 
are, more specifically, the ‘vernacular’ (Scott 2012, 30 ff.) methods that 
participants in any social order adopt in navigating and stabilising that very 
order ‘from within’ (Garfinkel 1967, viii). One interesting feature that Garfinkel 
remarks in the accounts members produce to make their activities intelligible to 
each other is the use of ‘indexical’ expressions. These are references, indices, 
to semantic surroundings that are simply taken for granted, but which are 
indispensable to give an utterance its intelligibility. 
The importance of indexical expressions is to disclose the presence of 
situated rationalities that members in any social interaction produce as part of 
the process of their acting together. There is a sense, therefore, in which 
Garfinkel’s work manages to stress the active production of ‘organised settings’ 
for the conduct of everyday life (Garfinkel 1967, 33). These constitute the 
                                            
3 Which he picks up from Wittgenstein’s concern for the pre-linguistic 
moorings of language games (Lock and Strong 2010, 336). 
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background against which indexical expressions can and do play an active role 
in enabling rationalities by which social interaction acquires situated 
intelligibility. People, in other words, speak ‘into’ an organised setting to which 
they constantly seem to refer to. Simultaneously, in their acting ‘into’ a setting, 
they equally contribute to performing and stabilising the vernacular order 
necessary for their talk to retain its intelligibility. 
One interesting direction in which Garfinkel’s insights have been developed 
is in the line of inquiry known as Science, Technology and Society (Law 2004, 
12 ff.). Bruno Latour’s ethnography of laboratory practices (Latour, Woolgar, 
and Salk 1986; Latour 1987), for instance, is one example of how even the 
most ‘rigorous’ of organised social settings—scientific inquiry and practice—
does not achieve complete closure, and relies for its viability on a surrounding 
context, which it must produce. In this respect, John Law (2004) uses the term 
‘hinterland’ to refer precisely to the fact that any situated social practice can be 
visualised as having threads departing from it that take root into something 
outside of that very practice. For any organised setting to be possible, a 
hinterland has to be actively assembled (Law 2004, 27 ff.) and the study of the 
social therefore becomes the study of assemblages (Law 2004, 31).4 
The contested, constructed and fragile nature of scientific epistemes 
removes the possibility to consider these as superior to any other organised 
context for social action. It no longer makes sense, then, to keep hammering 
away at some ‘object of study’ with tools and languages developed outside of 
the very context that is being examined. As Garfinkel once again advises, a 
focus on ‘ethnomethodologies’ deprives of legitimacy efforts to afford 
explanations arrived at ‘using a rule or a standard obtained outside actual 
settings within which [relevant] properties are recognized, used, produced, and 
talked about by settings’ members’ (Garfinkel 1967, 33).  
The sensation emerging from these contributions is one where social 
phenomena appear to pull themselves by the bootstraps: their appearance is 
not occasioned from outside the phenomena themselves, but hatched from 
within. This means that social phenomena appear through an appearing, which 
takes the shape of a progressive fashioning of the very conditions for the 
                                            
4 This is, in turn, a term taken from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 
90). 
  10 
organised continuation of their appearance. In this sense, sociological 
research—by trying to follow the making of assemblages through which realities 
are actively instituted—morphs (at least in my own practice of it) into phronesis. 
Phronesis, a concept first introduced by Aristotle, I understand as reflective 
judgment: a form of decision-making that develops its criteria as the decision 
gets underway (Ferrara 1998, 41 ff.). This type of judgment, context-dependent 
and tentatively articulated, does not work by subsumption but is inherently 
metaphorical and ad hoc, case-based (Flyvbjerg 2001, 135–6). Therefore, a 
phronetic-inspired approach to researching the social, like the one I have tried 
to follow, is not so much oriented to the development of explanatory theories 
about an observed situation. It is, instead, a hermeneutics of practice, in the 
sense of seeking to understand the situational ethics and navigational judgment 
that orients participants entangled in a particular socio-material and historically 
unfolding milieu (Flyvbjerg 2001, 136–37). 
Ultimately, the problem of looking at (social) phenomena in their unfolding 
calls for an account of how organised settings are instituted, and how people 
‘go on’ inside these, perched simultaneously in a work of indexing and 
referencing shared settings, as well as acting to change these based on 
situated forms of judgment that owe their intelligibility to their being deployed 
into an already existing context. It is to an understanding of this dialectic that 
Latour and Hodder contribute. 
 
iii. Entanglements in Latour and Hodder 
Bruno Latour, whose ethnography of laboratory practices I mentioned earlier, 
became fascinated with the ways in which particular phenomenal realities are 
actively stabilised. In Science in Action, he directed his focus towards inscription 
devices, for example, which enable the ‘translation’ of one material form into 
another that can be plugged into subsequent manipulations (Law 2004, 20; 
Latour 1987, 68–9). In Reassembling the Social, he discusses objects more 
generally and elucidates their contribution to ‘assembling the social’ through a 
comparison between human and baboon sociality, referencing the work of 
Shirley Strum (1987). Namely, he suggests that baboons face the problem of 
providing stability to their social interaction without possessing material 
equipment through which relationships can be sheltered from the need for 
constant renegotiation and reassembling (Latour 2005, 197–8). For Latour, 
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therefore, the immanent complexity of human societies is made possible 
through the use of objects, which become the centrepiece of the approach 
known as actor-network theory. The basic idea behind actor-network theory 
(ANT) is that every node of agency (or actant) ‘leaks’ junctures towards other 
(human and nonhuman) actants, and it is against those connections that it 
asserts its efficacy. In this sense, every actant can be ‘zoomed into’, to unearth 
a network of dependencies through which it is effectively assembled. A 
necessary role in this process is played by objects, as these offer the promise to 
embody particular modes of relating into a material substrate that introduces a 
degree of automation (and, therefore, stability) in the replication and 
reproduction of actor-networks.  
On this reading, the task of social inquiry becomes, to the aspiring actor-
network theorist, to ‘trace’ an actor-network. To navigate human-thing 
assemblages and probe their joints to see how those assemblages hold 
together and emerge from a distributed process of negotiation across different 
sites of agency straddling both the human and the nonhuman camp. For this 
reason, Latour suggests to focus on movements of the social, on the ‘sparks’ 
left behind as actor-networks re-constellate themselves over time, so as to 
capture their dynamism. 
These considerations are not exclusive to Latour, however. For instance, 
they resonate strongly with the work of philosopher Annemarie Mol. In her study 
The Body Multiple (2002), she examines the production of ‘atherosclerosis’ in a 
Dutch university hospital. In that work, she contends that it is better to refer to 
atheroscleroses, in the plural, because the disease that is spoken about in the 
singular is actually enacted in different modalities depending on the site of 
diagnosis or treatment where ‘it’ is acted upon: from the outpatient clinic to the 
pathology laboratory, down to the operating theatre and the radiology 
department. Moreover, all such sites of practice simultaneously interfere with 
each other and negotiate forms of coordination (Mol 2002, 83–84; Law 2004, 
53). In sum, Mol further contributes to an awareness of the abstractions at work 
when a reality is divorced from the process by which it emerges, namely from its 
coming into being and recursive production (Law 2004, 55–57).5 
                                            
5 Mol also notes how, since concrete practices have the ability to enact and 
instantiate realities that can be radically different to one another, questions of 
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My next step moving on from Latour’s work has been Ian Hodder’s Entangled 
(Hodder 2012). Hodder, an archaeologist by training, distances himself from 
Latour to a degree, by virtue of wanting to ascribe even greater symmetry 
between the agency of humans and that of nonhumans. For Hodder, while 
humans place reliance on things, the latter also exert their own demands for 
care and maintenance that require the adoption of dedicated social 
arrangements to accommodate thing-dependencies (Hodder 2012, 71 & 187–
8). In his account, the dependence (as in ‘relying/leaning on’) and dependency 
(as in being ‘stuck’ in a relationship of maintenance) between humans and 
things is visceral to the point that it becomes difficult to really tell the two apart. 
Towards the end of Entangled, he also links to scholarship looking at how the 
concept of ‘mind’, which is typically understood as something instantiated in 
brain circuitry, can be understood instead as a distributed ecology that has 
bodies ‘entangled’ with a wider material milieu (Malafouris 2013; Noe 2010). In 
other words, the material world is understood to offer a scaffolding for cognitive 
processes, acting as a kind of outsourced mind.  
This contribution offers a very useful resource to re-situate ethical questions 
inside the ‘hurly-burly’ of the everyday. This is because an expanded 
conception of mind to include object ecologies dramatically expands the context 
in which decisions emerge. If, in fact, things (and their unpredictability) cling to 
humans as much as the opposite is also true, then they also constitute the 
context ‘into’ which humans are to find the resources to make decisions about 
how best to navigate particular circumstances. There is, in other words, a sense 
in which entanglements exert demands that nudge ethical sensibilities in 
particular directions. This is a point made by Carolan (2011, 148; see also Berry 
2004, 200), who argues that taking a stand on a problem is not merely a matter 
of stating a ‘normative’ position but, rather, one of creating a fact, a body, a 
thing that embeds a particular orientation (for what to do next) in a material site 
of agency that will translate that orientation into a pressing demand to be 
heeded to. In this way, questions of ethics become deeply entwined with 
                                                                                                                                
‘ontological politics’ are central to the plane of practice. These questions have 
to do with the dilemmas that confront the enactment and the mattering of 
particular realities, disclosing commitments (to specific forms of life) that can be 
furthered by making one intervention over another (Mol 2002, 174–178). 
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questions of what ‘matters’, in the literal sense of what entanglements can be 
facilitated to turn our ethical affinities into material dependencies.  
 
iv. Intra-action and related-difference  
Karen Barad takes furthest this elision of a priori, ontological differences 
between qualitatively different entities, such as human and nonhuman, or 
subject and object. In my reading of her work, it makes little sense to demarcate 
ontological differences as though one found oneself on the outside looking in, 
merely describing what one is purportedly seeing from an external standpoint. 
Instead, she suggests that differences and boundaries—far from being taken for 
granted—ought to be precisely the object of study in their production. That it is 
from within the phenomenon that we have to grasp its conditions of possibility. 
And it is from within the phenomenon that the possibility of ‘externality’ 
emerges. 
She asks us to stop thinking in terms of inter-action, between supposedly 
self-contained entities (Barad 2007, 137), and to begin looking instead at intra-
actions. These are the relationships of mutual constitution through which 
agencies differentiate one another as distinct and external to each another, but 
always within the progressive unfolding of a phenomenon. In this sense, 
therefore, phenomena materialise through the intra-actions of agencies that are 
constituted in the mattering itself. Ultimately, then, there are only phenomena in 
their appearing. And, in the appearing, patterns of mattering emerge, affording 
distinctions that demarcate separate intra-acting agencies, even though these 
‘are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as 
individual elements’ (Barad 2007, 33). This is the sense in which the 
‘externality’ of differentiated agencies is produced from within the phenomenon.  
Externality, Barad adds, is produced through an apparatus that enacts an 
agential cut, a distinction, that enables the making-determinate and intelligible 
of separate intra-acting agencies within the phenomenon (Barad 2007, 148 & 
175). So that, ultimately, these agencies are produced as external to each 
other, despite being enfolded in the common generative process of the 
mattering of the phenomenon.  
From the conflation of epistemology and ontology that becomes possible 
within Barad’s ‘agential realism’, yet another consequence has to do with the 
possibility for ethical action: ‘ethics is not simply about responsible actions in 
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relation to human experiences of the world; rather, it is a question of material 
entanglements and how each intra-action matters in the reconfiguring of these 
entanglements, that is, it is a matter of the ethical call that is embodied in the 
very worlding of the world’ (Barad 2007, 160). Ethics is less of a commitment, 
and more of an ‘incarnate relation’ (Barad 2007, 392). Intra-action means that 
everything is part of the world and its becoming, so that responsibility is 
reconfigured not so much as the rolling out of pre-fashioned commitments onto 
some ‘external’ reality. Rather, responsibility is inherent in our participating in 
the ongoing mattering of the world. On this understanding, ethics stresses the 
participatory quality of every intra-action; it is fundamentally situated and 
situational, context-dependent. Ultimately, there is no self-standing ethics, in 
Barad’s agential realism, but ethics is—tellingly—the attribute of a relational 
reaching out: an ethical call, ‘an invitation that is written into the very matter of 
all being and becoming’ (Barad 2007, 396), to being alive to the emergent 
possibilities for going on from within the thicket of a phenomenon in its 
mattering. 
Barad’s views resonate, on a number of different levels, with those of 
Pickering. In The Mangle of Practice (1995), he sketches a way of looking at 
world-making centred on the notion of the ‘mangle’. Beginning from the idea 
that the world is filled with agency (Pickering 1995, 6), Pickering suggests that 
the human and the nonhuman do not just inter-act with one another but are, in 
many ways, mutually constituted or ‘mangled’ (Pickering 1995, 23). This, in the 
sense that human practices typically envelop machines and—by virtue of 
relating to these—they become themselves more machine-like (Pickering 1995, 
16), blurring the distinction between the human and the nonhuman (Pickering 
1995, 7). From here to replacing inter-action with intra-action that mutually 
constitutes differentiated sites of agency in the mattering of the world—as 
Barad perhaps would have it—does not seem to be an impossible step to take.  
In their being ‘constitutively intertwined’ (Pickering 1995, 17), agencies—
human and nonhuman—are mangled together as they relate to each other 
through a dialectic of resistance and accommodation. The image I have in mind 
when I picture this dialectic is of a tentative stumbling, looking for openings and 
passages from within the thicket of the ‘plane of practice’ (Pickering 1995, 20). 
Even though Pickering does not explicitly engage with ethics, as Barad does, it 
emerges from his writings that practice is constantly perched in the effort to 
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square possible openings for ‘going on’ from where we are (i.e. for future 
practice) with the living material-discursive tradition from within which one 
comes to deploy one’s agency (Pickering 1984, 87 & 114; Pickering 1995, 20). 
Ethics, here, is a matter of reading possibilities and achieving ‘fittingness’ in a 
temporally extended mesh.  
In this sense, the ‘mangle’ that Pickering talks about appears akin to the talk 
of ‘phenomena’ that Barad adopts. The ‘mangle’ appears like a temporally 
extended and materially embodied matrix that bodies forth through the 
deployment of agency that constitutes itself in the very mattering of the 
phenomenon, entangled deep within its folds. Pickering’s and Barad’s work find 
another possible correspondence in Goethe’s phenomenology of nature, the 
possibilities of which I became acquainted with through the writings of the late 
Henri Bortoft (Bortoft 1996; Bortoft 2012). 
A physicist by training, Bortoft taught at Schumacher College, where I based 
myself during the fieldwork conducted for Everything Gardens. Central to 
Bortoft’s work is the concept of appearance. Appearance, for him, is an 
unfinished process that is better captured as a verb: an appearing. Bortoft, 
building on Goethe, focuses on the holographic relationship between the 
phenomenon as a whole and its parts (there is an evident parallel here with 
phenomena and their intra-agential components, which Barad talks about). He 
discards attempts to prioritise one over the other, and conveys instead a sense 
in which these are mutually constitutive of one another. The whole bodies forth 
through the parts, that themselves find ‘fittingness’ in the unfolding of an 
emergent whole. Central to the bodying forth of a whole, of a phenomenon, is a 
process of relatedness-in-differentiation.  
He elucidates this with a few examples that are beautifully illustrative of his 
delicate phenomenology. The first is Goethe’s theory of colours, where Bortoft 
illustrates how Goethe found Newton’s reduction of colours to a mere 
consequence of differential refractability of light as wave unsatisfactory. This, 
because this theory had nothing to say on the patterns of internal differentiation 
of the phenomenon of colour. Why, for instance, do the colours on Newton’s 
spectrum appear in a certain order, and why do other colours altogether appear 
on spectra obtained through different experimental set-ups? Through an effort 
of ‘exact sensorial imagination’, Goethe attempted to dwell in the phenomenon 
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to grasp the process of differentiation in its making, which presupposes a 
differencing that reveals outwardly separate qualities as related to one another: 
 
When we follow the coming-into-being of distinction in this way, we 
notice that distinguishing has the effect of relating. To mark out 
‘something’, to give a boundary to ‘it’, is thereby to relate it to that 
from which it is distinguished—i.e. to distinguish ‘something’ is at the 
same time to distinguish what is ‘other’ by virtue of that very 
distinction—and to which it is thereby related. The point here is that 
the relation is intrinsic to the act of distinguishing, and not an external 
connection between separate ‘somethings’, which have already been 
distinguished (Bortoft 1996, 136) 
 
So it is, for instance, that Goethe grasps the different colour spectra as qualities 
arising from the formative process of lightening darkness or darkening light. 
What he tries to reach for is the dimension in which outwardly separate 
presentations are enfolded within a generative unity that creates these through 
self-differencing.  
The same equally applies to Goethe’s study of plants. His claim that ‘all plant 
is leaf’ (Bortoft 1996, 80), Bortoft does not interpret literally, as if to say that all 
organs of the plant are actually developed from a leaf. Instead, this is 
understood as a possibility to grasp the plant in its making and as developing 
outwardly different parts in a ‘formative doing’ (Bortoft 1996, 270), ‘metamorphic 
sequence’ (Bortoft 1996, 80), or ‘intensive depth’ (Bortoft 1996, 71). Central to 
this approach is to try and find, within the phenomenon, the ‘grammar’ of its 
unfolding, approaching it on its own terms and making it speak in its own 
language (Bortoft 1996, 309–20).  
In this sense, the contributions discussed in this section gesture towards 
what might seem the cacophony of differences in a live socio-material medium, 
and they begin to direct attention instead towards the generative processes 
(intra-action, relatedness-in-difference) from which those various forms 
originate, as differential emanations of an unfolding phenomenon. 
 
v. Accompanying life from within: from Ingold to Shotter 
In my own thinking about Transition, Shotter’s work helped me ‘see’ the intra-
action, agential cuts, the mangled entwining and the ‘whole’ that authors like 
Barad, Pickering and Bortoft discuss. Shotter’s work manages to ‘translate’ 
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those ideas in a manner that made them ‘seeable’, for me, in the real-life 
transacting within a social phenomenon like Transition. 
A productive way into Shotter’s programme is perhaps through the work of 
anthropologist Tim Ingold, who shares a similar aspiration. One of Ingold’s 
central concerns is to differentiate the knowing about seemingly separate and 
external ‘things’ from knowing from within the formative processes of life (Ingold 
2012, 5). This particular concern, of course, is not new to anthropology as a 
discipline, and can be traced as far back as the work of Malinowski, who first 
established the problem of grasping the ‘native’s point of view’ (Howell 2013, 
120), inaugurating the practice of ‘participant observation’ (Eriksen and Nielsen 
2001, 42–43). On a very basic level, Malinowski’s approach to fieldwork 
provides an early formulation of the yearning to grasp the sense-making 
processes at work in the ‘experiential contrasts’ an observer encounters (Rudie 
1994, 23). This aspiration has, on one end, informed a discussion about 
positionality and reflexivity—as exemplified by the work of Rosaldo (Salzman 
2002, 807)—and, on the other, it has ushered a focus on the back-and-forth, 
analogic and inter-subjective character of sense-making: it is to this latter 
concern that Ingold speaks, from a phenomenological perspective.6 
The fundamental problem Ingold sees with knowing about is that it jumps the 
gun and undertakes what he calls an ‘inversion’, something he describes 
through an image, whereby ‘we are tempted to reinterpret the drawn line not as 
the trace of a gestural movement but as the perimeter of a geometrical form’ 
(Ingold 2008, 1804). We take what is left behind by the drawing of a circle on 
paper as closed, finished, self-enclosed form, rather than as a knot along a 
trajectory that leads elsewhere (Ingold 2008, 1803). For Ingold, it is important 
instead to find ways to follow life in its making, to travel with the formative trails 
and the loose ends that do not simply move across from form to form, but bind 
these in an inextricable meshwork (Ingold 2008, 1803, 1805). In view of this, 
Ingold sees the task of anthropology to lie in corresponding with the dynamism 
of a life-form ‘in its own movement of growth or becoming’ (Ingold 2012, 7). 
Tracing the internal movement of life turns anthropology into a study of 
                                            
6 In this, Ingold innovates on older interpretive approaches—such as Clifford 
Geertz’s (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001, 103–104)—that consider culture as given 
and interpretation as the one-way ‘cracking’ of its code. 
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possibilities, which entails joining ‘with people in their speculations about what 
life might or could be like’ (Ingold 2012, 4).7 In this sense, to grasp the unfolding 
of social phenomena it is necessary to develop the necessary agility to navigate 
the creeping excess of social forms, and follow them in their intra-twining and 
intra-lacing as they multiply entanglements and possibilities for differentiation. It 
is to this sense that Shotter’s scholarship also speaks. His own thinking 
copiously references the work in literary criticism by Bakhtin (1986), and the 
latter’s concern with the dialogical. Moreover, in a particularly useful piece, he 
compares Bakhtin’s view of the dialogical character of intra-action with Karen 
Barad’s agential realism (Shotter 2011b).  
In that piece, he offers an interesting way into the dynamism of the social 
field by focusing on utterances. Utterances mark their own boundaries, enacting 
‘agential cuts’, because they delineate the openings that give others the 
possibility to respond to them. However, at the same time, they only make 
sense within an ongoing flow of speech. Utterances enact agential cuts while 
delineating agencies that are simultaneously enfolded within a speech 
phenomenon, not outside of it (Shotter 1993, 120; Shotter 2011c, 7). 
Moreover, while introducing utterances as speech acts, Shotter’s 
understanding of these is not as strictly linguistic phenomena, but dovetails with 
Barad’s understanding of agency as having an intra-twined material-discursive 
character (Barad 2003, 819–20). They are ‘as much material as mental; as 
much felt as thought, and thought as felt; they have neither a fully orderly nor a 
fully disorderly structure, neither a completely stable nor an easily changed 
organization, neither a fully subjective nor fully objective character’ (Shotter 
2011b, 48). In addition to this, events in a speech flow ‘are also non-locatable—
they are “spread out” among all those participating in them. They are neither 
“inside” people, but nor are they “outside” them; they are located in that space 
where inside and outside are one; nor is there a separate before and after […], 
neither an agent nor an effect, but only a meaningful, “enduring” intra-acting 
                                            
7 A similar disquiet is also voiced by anthropologists working in the anarchist 
tradition (Lynd and Grubačić 2009). These speak of ‘accompaniment’, which 
entails dwelling in another’s world to explore together possible ways forward by 
engaging in emergent forms of non-hierarchical mutual aid (Lynd and Grubačić 
2009, 103–104). 
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whole which cannot divide itself into separable inter-acting parts’ (Shotter 
2011c, 8). Finally, utterances are also disclosive (Shotter 1993, 72; Shotter 
forthcoming; quoting Bakhtin 1986, 119–20), in the sense that they ‘show’ and 
perform—and thereby bring to life—some events and not others, based on the 
‘the different agential cuts we make on the basis of the guiding expectations 
with which we go out to meet whatever is happening within our surroundings’ 
(Shotter on Barad, p. 12). 
Within this flow of intra-action, Shotter is particularly interested in new 
‘organisational moments’. Those are instances where a distinct ‘something’ 
emerges from the intra-twining of agential trajectories. In this sense, Shotter 
embarks on nothing short of a complete reversal of customary thinking about 
the social: ‘In the past, in our social inquiries, when we talk about such entities 
as “society”, “social relations”, “culture”, “organizations”, “language”, 
“communication”, “persons”, “the self”, and so on, we seem to have presumed 
that we all know perfectly well what the “it” is that is represented by the concept 
of the entity we are talking about’ (Shotter 2011b, 52). In contrast to this 
analytical mode, he proposes an ecological mode, aimed at tracing ‘what 
people (including ourselves) go on inside of’ (Shotter 2011b, 51). 
The birth of an organisational moment Shotter describes by reference to 
Giambattista Vico’s assertion, whereby it was ‘[f]rom Jove that the muse began’ 
(Shotter 1993, 64). Specifically, he expands Vico’s indication thus:  
 
[A]s everyone runs to shelter from the thunder, all in a state of fear, 
an opportunity exists for them to realize that it is the same thing that 
they all fear; and a look or a gesture will communicate this. What we 
might call ‘a moment of common reference’ exists between them 
(Shotter 1993, 64).  
 
And yet, the fear so discovered is one that points beyond the thunder itself (as 
its immediate trigger), but which cues all the other instances where the 
associated bodily sensation is equally manifested. So ‘the fable of Jove, the 
imaginary universal, “len[ds]” form to, and [is] “rooted” in, the prior 
establishment of a sensory topic, a sensuous totality linking thunder, with the 
shared fears at the limits of one’s being, and with recognizing the existence of 
similar feelings in others because of shared bodily activities’ (Shotter 1993, 65). 
In other words, a shared moment of common reference creates a recognisable 
‘something’, a resource that enables metaphorical articulation of experience 
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through a process of relating later bewildering encounters to the feelings 
experienced in that earlier sensory topic. In this sense, shared moments of 
common, embodied reference act as the sensory matrix from which more 
determinate forms (like the fable of Jove) begin to emerge and into which action 
becomes progressively entangled (Shotter 1993, 136–7).  
These incipient organisational forms Shotter calls ‘imaginary universals’, 
which are ‘intricate, holistic, imaginary structure[s] of intra-related feelings of 
tendency that would enable [one]—on encountering a particular phenomenon—
to sense what next [is] likely to follow from it’ (Shotter forthcoming, 19). Delving 
into the birth of an organisational moment, Shotter suggests how it would begin 
with bewilderment, with an arresting encounter, which starts to dissipate only as 
one dwells in it, and starts discerning a distinct ‘something’ emerging ‘in the 
dynamic relations, the differences, we can sense between our outgoing 
exploratory activities and their incoming results’ (Shotter 2011b, 39). It 
subsequently becomes possible to articulate this ‘something’ by reference to its 
similarity with other sensings already familiar to us. Eventually, he adds, ‘it is 
only after we have made use of a number of such [metaphorical] images to 
guide our further exploratory movements, that we can come to a sense of, 
come to feel completely acquainted with, the actual field of possibilities giving 
rise to them’ (Shotter 2011b, 39) And once we come to feel confident about 
knowing our way around such fields of possibility, only then will we have 
acquired competency in ‘resolving on different ways of “going on” within them 
according to the different “ends in view” we might wish to pursue’ (Shotter 
2011b, 39). 
The reference to ‘going on’ is particularly able to encapsulate the nature of 
social inquiry ‘from within’. When navigating our intra-actions, a central problem 
Shotter discusses is that of finding an orientation. An image he often uses to 
convey a sense of this problem is that of the utterance as a ‘prosthetic stick’. 
Negotiating one’s way in the social field is about achieving a ‘grip’ on our 
surroundings, such that we can become aware of what openings are available 
to us at any one time, and that we can be drawn to those attachments that best 
‘fit’ with the flow of events that has shaped the situation up to that moment. The 
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social, in sum, is a matter of being enmeshed in ‘living traditions’,8 of collectively 
embodied and temporally extended (discursive-material) arguments that ‘call’ 
out responses from those embroiled in them, and provide the resources for their 
further specification. A ‘living tradition’ he also calls a ‘providential space’, in the 
sense of an ‘organized setting’ that self-specifies as it unfolds, by providing the 
resources that constrain and enable its further evolution, transformation or 
dissolution (Shotter 1993, 68). And social inquiry, then, is about accompanying 
the everyday ethical dilemmas, deployed in our always tentative organisational 
forms, which manifest as moments of hesitation in our going from ‘here’ to 
‘there’ (Shotter 1993, 48) to afford continuation to a living tradition in its 
appearing as a phenomenon.  
It is an inquiry of this sort that I have attempted in Everything Gardens. 
Specifically, on the back of these methodological considerations, I have 
adopted an orientational focus, which foregrounds the concerted search for 
viable practical orientations in the face of arresting encounters that demand 
new culturally mediated responses. This is in opposition to an instrumental 
focus, which approaches social formations as strategies oriented towards reified 
programmatic definitions. An orientational focus is one that tries to 
accompany—in keeping with Ingold’s and Shotter’s programmes of inquiry—the 
process by which Transition, as a socio-material formation, etches itself into 
shape as it comes into its own.  
This simple, but significant, shift opens to view a whole new realm of 
everyday negotiations: those dilemmatic moments where uncertainty surfaces 
as to how a particular trajectory of concerted action and inquiry ought to be 
continued, in a manner appropriate to changed circumstances and to the 
                                            
8 The idea of ‘living tradition’ resonates with the notion of ‘habitus’ advanced 
by Mauss (1979) and developed, for instance, by Bourdieu (1984). It is 
especially close on the formulation proposed by Inglis (2005, 21), as embodied 
‘ways of thinking, feeling and acting […] characteristic of the group’. It is a short 
step, from here, to argue that a living tradition ‘is rooted both in people’s 
embodied knowledge and in their embodied evaluative attitudes, and is a 
historically extended argument, conducted both in speech and action, as to how 
both their knowledge and their attitudes might best be formulated’ (Shotter 
1993, 153). 
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demands elicited by arresting encounters. The way I have attempted to relate to 
and re-present this horizon is twofold. On the one hand, I chose to adopt 
research methods that would afford the opportunity to become conversant in 
the ‘vernacular’ ethnomethodologies by which participants in the unfolding of 
Transition manage to negotiate this milieu against the grain of contingency and 
of its erratic process of growth and consolidation (see section vi below). 
On the other hand, in the narration crafted in Everything Gardens, this focus 
has translated into an attunement to the interplay between differentiation and 
continuity, as Transition evolves a cultural repertoire to sustain a growing array 
of experiential possibilities. I was aided in this by Goethe’s prompt to behold the 
relatedness-in-difference through which a phenomenon’s unfolding proceeds, 
such that the production of difference always occurs as the emanation of a 
common generative movement. In relation to Transition, this has focused my 
attention, first of all, on the dynamics whereby it remains open to continual 
specification, endeavouring to sustain an expanding array of everyday activities 
and collective practices by evolving a matching range of material and discursive 
cultural resources. So, for example, the concerted search for resources to 
address the consistency between ends and means in the work of Transition 
becomes recognisable under the name of Inner Transition, and enshrines an 
openness to the practices of ‘inner work’. Secondly, as the culture of Transition 
specifies itself across a variety of realms of concerted activity, the challenge 
arises to ensure their reciprocal accommodation, so that they can remain 
recognisable as participant parts in the unfolding of the same cultural 
phenomenon, rather than as tangents divorced from one another. To continue 
the earlier example: in the monograph I equally tease out the dilemmas that 
confront the specification of Inner Transition, as it negotiates an acceptance by 
working around resistances ingrained in received binaries between the ‘secular’ 
and the ‘religious’.  
This interplay between continuity and differentiation also resonates with 
Shotter’s notion of a ‘living tradition’, as an argument open to continuation and 
the continual unfolding of which prompts iterative revisitations of its very 
meaning, in order to afford responses to supervening orientational difficulties. In 
Everything Gardens, I suggest that this tension can be witnessed in Transition 
in the interplay between inclusivity vis-à-vis new experiential possibilities, and 
the flurry of internal negotiations through which the import of its extant cultural 
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resources comes to be reworked, so as to make them speak to the difficulties of 
finding new footings as Transition is carried into novel experiential grounds. 
Last, but not least, in Everything Gardens I also attempt to show—following 
the work of Latour and Hodder—how the practical dilemmas that present 
themselves to the unfolding of Transition are channelled by the specific 
demands and anticipations inscribed in the tapestry of discursive and material 
resources that conjure Transition to life. For instance, the need emerges for 
appropriate resources to support everyday modes of relating in mindful and 
compassionate ways (the remit of Inner Transition) only after a ‘community’ has 
been assembled around other sorts of practical tasks and attachments (like, 
say, tending to an alternative currency scheme). In this sense, the cultural 
tangle of Transition affords both a practical orientation for ‘going on’, as well as 
calling forth difficulties specific to its particular material and discursive trajectory, 
affording access to distinctive sets of new difficulties (and not others). Here, the 
notions of Barad’s ‘ethical call’ and Mol’s ‘ontological politics’ speak to the 
unfolding of Transition, as described in Everything Gardens, locating ethical 
deliberation in the process of evolving (of ‘mattering’) the material-discursive 
attachments that carry a Transition culture. 
 
vi. Why Everything Gardens 
In view of these considerations, Everything Gardens can then be read as a 
challenge to the seemingly ‘natural’ argumentative move undertaken in copious 
other literature on the topic. In fact, many academic writers on Transition tend to 
posit at the outset of their inquiry a definition of what Transition is meant to be 
‘about’. In an oft-visited reading of it, Transition is about devising 
possibilities/innovations for life after peak-oil. While I would agree that this has 
been one of the self-descriptions engendered from within Transition, especially 
around its inception, academic commentary seems to have turned it into a 
cage. 9 Once peak-oil becomes the informing goal of a monologic order of 
connectedness according to which Transition is meant to be explained, a 
                                            
9 Shotter’s words put this in a most telling manner: ‘Something which was at 
first merely an assumption takes on the appearance of a definition; and what 
had a social history of its production appears as an atemporal, ahistorical 
system of natural necessities’ (Shotter 1993, 28). 
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constellation of relevant questions emerges (Shotter 1993, 197). These 
questions typically revolve around the making of predictions as to the supposed 
efficacy of Transition at ‘rolling out’ its goal into the world. The literature on the 
topic is vast, and this relapse in a representationalist, two-world attitude 
(normative goals versus the world ‘out there’) seems to have gripped a fair 
share of scholarship in human geography on the topic, trying to isolate factors 
contributing to the success or failure of Transition initiatives. The title of a recent 
paper by Feola and Nunes (2013) exemplifies this spirit most vividly: ‘Success 
and Failure of Grassroots Innovations for Addressing Climate Change: The 
Case of the Transition Movement’. 
I do not, however, intend to dismiss this strand of scholarship outright. 
Instead, my aspiration is much more modest, namely to add diversity to an all-
too-common way of imagining Transition that overshadows alternative 
possibilities. Transition is about peak oil if that is the only question that is asked 
of it (Inglis 2005, 98). The point I try to make in my book, however, is that a 
more holistic sense of Transition is needed to express the multiple agencies 
that are enfolded in its development (beyond that of the aforementioned 
academic tribe). And, in this sense, Transition can disclose many different 
possibilities for life together to the various other Transitioners who found 
themselves somewhat drawn or attached to its development.10  
For this purpose, building on the phenomenological literature discussed in 
the previous sections, I have endeavoured precisely to access the formative 
movement by which Transition demarcates an emergent form of life, in such a 
way that does not overlook the orientational dilemmas and agential negotiations 
that shape its unfolding. Having discarded a comparative approach because it 
requires a prior definition of the entities being compared, I resorted instead to a 
                                            
10 Incidentally, the attempt—in my recollection of the unfolding of Transition—
to chart hitherto overlooked articulations (beyond ‘responding to peak oil’) of a 
developing form of social life aligns with a long-standing focus in sociology on 
‘unintended consequences’; arguably a recurring theme in the discipline, 
starting in the work of Robert Merton (manifest and latent functions) and 
developed, albeit in somewhat different directions, by Norbert Elias (figurations) 
and Ulrich Beck (risk), among others (Mica, Peisert, and Winczorek 2011, 12 & 
18–19). 
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range of qualitative methods 11  in a four-month period of fieldwork spent 
researching the first Transition initiative in Totnes. During that time I was based 
at Schumacher College, an educational institution with many ties to the milieu of 
Transition (Russi 2015, 32 ff.); something which allowed me to approach others 
navigating the same cultural world in a capacity closer to that of insider or 
‘participant observer’.12 
In my time in Totnes, I have also carried out thirty semi-structured interviews, 
aimed at gathering testimonies either from people directly involved in one or 
more of the many articulations of Transition, or who straddled that membership 
alongside other cultural affiliations (for instance to the milieu of ‘progressive 
spirituality’). My focus in those interviews was on asking ‘how’ questions, aimed 
at facilitating the sharing of rich personal narratives, as opposed to eliciting 
justification in response to ‘why’ questions.13 Since I discuss these in greater 
depth in chapter 2 of the book (Russi 2015, 66 ff.), it will suffice here to clarify 
that the purpose of interviews was to understand how various participants had 
been drawn into the Transition milieu, and of the orientational dilemmas that 
had become apparent to them from within it. The choice of interviewees was 
initially determined by their direct involvement in various Transition projects in 
Totnes (such as the Totnes Pound, or Inner Transition). From those contacts, it 
became apparent what further interviews ought to be undertaken, for instance 
with individuals who straddled affiliations to multiple projects, or who otherwise 
occupied liminal spaces on the edge of Transition and other cultural 
involvements without an institutionalised connection to it. The interviewing 
process was also aided and underpinned by my own participant observation of 
Transition, as I had a chance to take part or help organise events pertaining to 
various aspects of Transition, such as food-growing, Inner Transition, the 
Totnes Pound and REconomy. My personal involvement in these equally 
offered the chance to experience the negotiations pertaining to objects (such as 
local and complementary currencies or the institutional forms of Transition 
entrepreneurial ventures) and bodily practices (such as ‘mindful’ meeting 
                                            
11 On this, see the discussion I undertake in chapter 1 (Russi 2015, 38 ff.). 
12 I describe the tensions and challenges inherent in the role of ‘participant 
observer’ at length in chapter 1 (Russi 2015, 32 ff.). 
13 This is a suggestion I take up from Becker (1998, chap. 2). 
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techniques) that materialise the cultural lifeworld of Transition. In sum, the 
overall idea behind the adoption of these methods was for me to journey 
through Transition, tracking the unfolding of the material-discursive tapestry that 
demarcates a distinctive form of life. One that iteratively works out the 
conditions of possibility for its further development, in a way that a definition 
simply cannot capture. 
In chapter 2 of the book, I dwell further on this difficulty of encapsulating 
Transition in a definition, by means of a sequential reading of the different texts 
about it that were written from within the Transition milieu, by a prominent figure 
in Transition’s inception, namely Rob Hopkins. If the peak oil and climate 
change thread dominates the view in the first book (Hopkins 2008), this is 
juxtaposed to other paths by which people might grow into Transition (and have 
it grow on them). In a very poignant passage of The Transition Companion 
(Hopkins 2011), Hopkins puts it best:  ‘Transition creates a space and a context 
within which people are invited to get going on projects they are passionate 
about, with the support of a larger organisation and with connections to other 
projects’ (2011, chap. 2). What a formulation of this sort conveys is much closer 
to ‘anything goes’ than Transition as ‘a community response to peak oil’ that is 
prominent in academic discourse. On the other hand, however, that same 
definition brings into focus the existence of a ‘context’ to Transition, so that 
‘anything goes’ as long as it fits within the ‘organised setting’ that Transition as 
a living tradition creates, simultaneously enabling and constraining future 
possibilities for action.  
Approaching Transition as still unfinished moving, my aim has been to offer a 
sense of its ‘style’ as a lifeworld unfolding through time, by lodging myself deep 
into the forks in the road where it self-specifies through differentiations that 
instantiate yet more complex possibilities for intra-relating. So it is, for instance, 
that I spend a lot of time in chapter 3, trying to provide an account not just of 
how Transition stems from permaculture, but also of the ways in which it differs 
from it. Or, in chapter 4, I try to look at the development of Inner Transition, and 
the negotiations that it gives rise to across the milieu of Transition. The process 
whereby paths of agency delineate themselves within the unfolding of 
Transition as a social phenomenon is one that, following Karen Barad, entails 
the enacting of cuts that craft provisional boundaries along which inclusions and 
exclusions come into being. And the exclusionary aspect, for instance, I discuss 
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in relation to the Costa campaign in chapter 8, alongside the seeds of further 
(intra-)activity it sparks. The mending of the ‘Costa backlash’ I understand to be 
directed at providing resources—new moments of embodied common reference 
occasioned through shared doings, such as through the Food Hub—to be 
leveraged in acting into those gaps through which we come into contact with 
other intra-acting agencies by sensing their difference (Shotter 2011a, 120–1 & 
135), and to which we are called to offer a new response (Shotter 2011a, 100).  
Finally, I do not venture to predict where Transition may go on from where I 
left it at, as this would contradict the very sense of it as an open-ended 
movement open to still further specification; a common Transition motto puts it 
most succinctly: ‘let it go where it wants to go’ (Hopkins 2008, 172; Hopkins 
2011, chap. 9). The goal of the book, instead, is simply to offer up the threads I 
have been following in my direct experience of Transition, so that its generative 
tensions and disquiets, and the intensity of its ongoing adjustment and 
reconfiguration can offer a way into the excess-ive character of this living 
phenomenon, such that it thrives by bursting through any definitional fences 
built around it. It is in this sense, I believe, the metaphor of ‘everything gardens’ 
is an apt one for Transition. 
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